Exploring Climate Framework Laws and The Future of Climate Action by Huang, Jennifer
Pace Environmental Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 2 Spring 2021 Article 3 
May 2021 
Exploring Climate Framework Laws and The Future of Climate 
Action 
Jennifer Huang 
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, jennifer.a.huang@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural 
Resources Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Huang, Exploring Climate Framework Laws and The Future of Climate Action, 38 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 285 (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol38/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of 




Exploring Climate Framework Laws and The 
Future of Climate Action 
JENNIFER HUANG* 
Every country in the world now has at least one law or policy to 
address climate change; these laws vary widely in type, scope, and 
ambition. Although scholarship on the many types and levels of 
effectiveness of enacted climate legislation is still growing, legal 
experts are taking note of a recent trend in the adoption of formal 
climate legislation that is economy-wide or cross-sectoral in scope, sets 
out both a broad and long-term direction for climate policy, and 
ensures some measure of accountability for the executive branch. In 
the absence of a commonly agreed definition, this article will loosely 
define criteria for these “climate framework laws.” 
This article identifies several countries that have adopted climate 
framework laws of this type: The United Kingdom, Mexico, New 
Zealand, and Denmark. These countries form a small case set from 
which to compare elements. From existing scholarship, this article 
draws on what lessons can be learned from their implementation. 
Whether the law is new or two decades old, each faces particular 
challenges and shortcomings. Climate framework laws create new 
risks but also incur a number of benefits that may be unique to them. 
This article examines the relationship between climate framework 
laws and the Paris Agreement, as well as implications for climate 
litigation. Finally, the article touches on the future of climate 
framework laws in other countries.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world is quickly losing precious time to address the climate 
crisis. The years from 2016 to 2020 have been a tumultuous and 
trying time for the international climate community. Those years are 
set to be the warmest five-year period on record, underling the rising 
and dangerous impacts of climate change.1 The 2016 United States 
(U.S.) presidential election abruptly flipped the narrative of an 
American climate renaissance from one in which President Barack 
Obama forged a historic partnership with China to ensure the 
successful adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement to one in which 
President Donald Trump would “save” America from a “bad” deal by 
withdrawing the U.S. from the very deal it helped secure,2 
underscoring the dangers of leaving climate action up to individual 
or party leadership.  
In spite of, or because of, these events, countries are increasingly 
adopting “climate framework laws”: top-down, legally binding 
 
1. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., UNITED IN SCIENCE 2020 at 2, 8 (Jürg 
Luterbacher et al. eds., 2020),  
https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10361 [https://perma.cc/2YQ4-
VVW4]. 
2.	President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate 
Accord, THE WHITE HOUSE: BRIEFINGS & STATEMENTS (June 1, 2017), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
trump-paris-climate-accord/ [https://perma.cc/R9AA-RGY4]. In 2019, President 
Trump formally submitted the notice of withdrawal, and on November 4, 2020, the 
United States officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement. U.N. Secretary-
General, Paris Agreement: United States of America: Withdrawal (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2019/CN.575.2019-Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H7CX-BUG2]; U.N. Secretary-General, Paris Agreement: United 






frameworks for climate action. While there are no commonly agreed 
definitions of “climate framework laws,” recent studies demonstrate 
that many of these climate laws are effective, producing real 
emission reductions over time and ensuring continuous climate 
action regardless of changes in political leadership. Scholarship on 
the many types and levels of effectiveness of these and other types of 
climate legislation is still growing.3 
Part II of this article will provide a brief introduction to current 
trends in climate laws and legislation. In Part III, this article will 
propose some initial criteria by which to define a “climate framework 
law,” the most robust and expansive of existing types of legal climate 
frameworks. In Part IV, this article identifies several countries that 
have adopted climate framework laws of this type—the United 
Kingdom (UK), Mexico, New Zealand, and Denmark—and compares 
the elements of their laws. From existing scholarship, Part V further 
draws on what lessons can be learned from their implementation. 
Whether the law is new or two decades old, they each face particular 
challenges and shortcomings. Climate framework laws create new 
risks but also incur a number of benefits that may be unique to them. 
Part VI examines their relationship to the Paris Agreement, and 
Part VII further explores implications for climate litigation. Finally, 
Part VIII of this article touches on the future of climate framework 
laws in other countries.  
II. TRENDS IN CLIMATE LAW AND LEGISLATION 
Every country in the world now has at least one law or policy to 
address climate change; globally, there are 1,800 such laws.4 These 
laws vary widely in type, scope, and ambition. While some are 
executive orders or policies issued by governments, others may be 
 
3. See generally Climate Change Governance, Legislation and Litigation, 
GRANTHAM RSCH. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV’T, 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/research-areas/climate-change-
governance-legislation-and-litigation [https://perma.cc/E9H9-NHRX].  
4. SHAIKH ESKANDER ET AL., Global Lessons from Climate Change Legislation 
and Litigation, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 44, 45–
46, 48 (Matthew Kotchen et al. eds., 2021); see also Climate Change Laws of the 
World, GRANTHAM RSCH. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV’T., https://climate-laws.org 
[https://perma.cc/5XN6-PT4E] (publicly accessible, searchable database hosted by 
the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change at the London School of 





legislative acts passed by parliament. Some provide a legal 
foundation for governmental process committed to carrying out 
specific obligations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the international 
environmental treaty addressing climate change. Others are 
broader, setting out a framework of laws that guide objectives, 
principles, and general procedures for climate policy development 
but otherwise lack specific targets and measures or accountability 
mechanisms.5 
While the sheer number of climate laws is impressive, legal 
experts are taking note of a growing trend in the adoption of formal 
climate legislation that is economy-wide or cross-sectoral in scope, 
sets out both a broad and long-term direction for climate policy, and 
ensures some measure of accountability for the executive branch. 
These types of frameworks seem like an ideal tool to both effectively 
address obligations under international climate agreements and to 
maximize national implementation efforts. 
III. CRITERIA FOR “CLIMATE FRAMEWORK LAWS” 
No definition of “climate framework law” or “framework climate 
legislation” has yet been established to describe these types of broad, 
ambitious, overarching legal instruments.6 They have been called 
“flagship legislation”7 and described as “wide-ranging pieces of high-
profile legislation that fundamentally define[] a country’s approach 
to climate change.”8 Grantham Research Institute calls them 
“strategic framework laws, which aim to create a unifying 
institutional structure to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or 
address physical climate risks, or often both.”9 An earlier, more 
expansive definition is “a law, or regulation with equivalent status, 
which serves as a comprehensive, unifying basis for climate change 
policy, which addresses multiple aspects or areas of climate change 
 
5. Michael A. Mehling & James S. Rawlins, Enacting Framework Legislation on 
Climate Change: Rationale, Trends and Outlook 2–3 (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). 
6. Id. at 3. 
7. Terry Townshend et al., Legislating Climate Change at the National Level, 53 
ENV’T: SCI. AND POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 5, 6–9 (2011). 
8. Sam Fankhauser et al., The Political Economy of Passing Climate Change 
Legislation: Evidence from a Survey, 35 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 52, 55 (2015). 




mitigation or adaptation (or both) in a holistic, overarching 
manner.”10 Three out of four countries have overarching framework 
laws.11 From ten to nearly thirty countries have adopted a “climate 
framework law” or “climate framework legislation,” depending on 
how such laws are defined.12  
As legal scholar Michael Mehling points out, these definitions 
take a functional approach that are at odds with how many lawyers 
would define legislation—by examining the formality of the 
legislation.13 While setting out a precise definition or criteria for 
identifying a climate framework law is challenging, this article 
attempts to begin to define climate framework laws by looking at the 
formality of the legislation and the constellation of arrangements 
that set a high bar for the governmental administration of climate 
change. These criteria are: 
• A legally-binding, comprehensive framework adopted by 
parliament with a singular focus on climate change, across all 
sectors, covering all greenhouse gases. Such a framework 
excludes single policy instruments or pieces of legislation 
with a narrow sectoral focus, such as energy; legislation 
serving multiple objectives, like development; and executive 
orders. 
• A mid-century mitigation target, or long-term direction of 
travel. The framework law explicitly recognizes the long-term 
challenge of addressing climate change, often providing a 
 





11. Shaikh Eskander & Sam Fankhauser, Reduction in Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from National Climate Legislation, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 750, 751 
(2020).  
12.	See Mehling & Rawlins, supra note 5, at 4; Sean Fleming, These Are the 
Countries That Have Made Their Climate Commitments Law, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 
13, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/new-zealand-net-zero-2050 
[https://perma.cc/J9RY-GCB5]. 
13. Energy FutureX, Governing for 2050: Climate Framework Laws in the EU, 






pathway by which to guide or judge shorter-term climate 
targets. 
• Short- or mid-term economy-wide mitigation target(s) or 
rolling carbon budgets. Rather than focusing on a specific 
sector or serving multiple objectives, the framework sets out 
an interim target or a series of targets on a pathway towards 
achieving climate neutrality. These have taken the form of a 
nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris 
Agreement or carbon budgets that inform such an NDC. 
• Consolidation of authority to act on climate to the executive 
branch and delegation of that authority to bodies through a 
clear hierarchy with public accountability. Responding to the 
myriad challenges of addressing climate change and the often 
data-driven obligations to global climate agreements requires 
clear mandates and delegated responsibilities. The executive 
branch is held publicly accountable, through regular 
reporting or other measure. 
• An independent climate change committee. An independent 
body of experts, rather than a government body tasked with 
the oversight of climate measures, can provide constructive 
criticism, incorporate civil society views, take into account 
scientific updates, review performance, and improve 
transparency of climate action. 
• Regular review, or regular process(es) to take into account new 
science, assess adequacy, update or realign ambition. For the 
framework and its processes to remain effective and relevant, 
targets and the latest science must be revisited on a periodic 
basis and updated as needed. 
These elements are not necessarily independent; they may be 
partnered or serve overlapping functions. For instance, the review 
process may be undertaken by the independent climate change 
committee, by internal review, or both.  
A number of jurisdictions’ climate laws possess many or some of 
these elements. However, climate framework laws that are the most 
robust and provide the greatest accountability for governments seem 
to meet all or nearly all of these criteria. Nevertheless, it is not to say 
that these are the only means by which to implement effective 




legislation in one jurisdiction could be covered by several 
interventions in another. China, for instance, has eight climate 
change laws, but they are effectively carried out when included as 
powerful provisions in Five-Year Plans—China’s blueprints for its 
economic and social development.14 Some governments can 
implement climate action more directly under other political 
structures.  
The importance of political will to carry out the aims of the 
climate law cannot be underestimated, but a combination of most of 
the criteria listed seem to ensure a framework that is durable, 
effective, and provides for accountability. This article considers 
several climate framework laws that illustrate this growing trend.  
IV. COUNTRY CASES  
This paper will briefly examine the climate framework laws for 
the UK, Mexico, New Zealand, and Denmark. It is worth noting that 
despite shared responsibility for climate policy under the European 
Union (EU), Member States’ approaches still vary. Several have 
adopted climate framework laws, though more have adopted climate 
framework law elements. The UK’s climate framework law predates 
its departure from the EU, but its effectiveness may bolster its 
reputation as an independent climate leader, particularly as host of 
the COP 26 climate change conference. Denmark’s climate 
framework law embeds a mid-century target that is more ambitious 
than the shared EU target. 
A. United Kingdom 
The UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act is generally credited as the 
earliest example of a climate framework law and the world’s first 
globally legally binding mitigation target.15 The Act was passed on 
the basis of increasing British support for climate action, which 
started in 2005 and continued gaining momentum leading up to the 
2009 Copenhagen climate summit as international expectations for 
 
14. ESKANDER ET AL., supra note 4, at 59. 
15.	See Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27 (UK); World’s First Climate Law is a 






the adoption of a new climate agreement grew.16 Passed with high 
political consensus and strong UK leadership, the Act is one of the 
most ambitious legislative frameworks on climate. 
The Act, as originally passed, mandated a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of at least eighty percent below 1990 levels 
by 2050.17 By amendment in 2019, the UK became the first major 
economy to commit to “net zero” emissions by 2050.18 The Act sets 
out five-year carbon budgets, limiting total emissions over each five-
year period consistent with the 2050 target.19 The Act also mandates 
a continuous five-year cycle of adaptation planning to increase 
resilience, requiring a risk assessment before developing a national 
adaptation program.20 
The Act further establishes a Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC), an independent advisory body that recommends the carbon 
budgets and monitors progress on mitigation and adaptation.21 
Other measures that ensure accountability include regular and 
public reporting. For example, the CCC produces an annual progress 
report22 as well as a biannual adaptation progress report.23 Further, 
the Secretary of State and ministers regularly report to Parliament, 
 
16. Mehling & Rawlins, supra note 5, at 11. 
17. Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27 § 1 (UK), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/section/1/enacted 
[https://perma.cc/QV3T-SS8J] (“It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that 
the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 
baseline.”); What is the 2008 Climate Change Act?, GRANTHAM RSCH. INST. ON 







18. Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27, § 1. “Net zero" or climate neutrality refers 
to achieving an overall balance between emissions produced and emissions taken out 
of the atmosphere. Josh Burke, What is Net Zero?, GRANTHAM RSCH. INST. ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV’T (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/what-is-net-zero/ 
[https://perma.cc/QU7P-U87Y]. 
19. Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27, § 4. 
20. Id. §§ 56, 58.  
21. Id. §§ 32–43. 
22. Id. § 36. 




taking into consideration the advice of the CCC,24 and the reports 
are debated in Parliament. Finally, the government has a statutory 
obligation to respond to the reports.25 
B. Mexico 
In 2012, Mexico became one of the first developing countries and 
the first large oil-producing emerging economy to adopt a climate 
framework law.26 In the three years prior, Mexico’s president worked 
across party lines at federal, state, and city levels in order to secure 
agreement on the policies needed to meet the bill’s targets. 
Additionally, Mexico’s climate credentials were further reinforced by 
its diplomatic efforts as host of the 2010 climate change conference 
in Cancún, which was praised for producing tangible outcomes in the 
wake of the 2009 Copenhagen summit.27 The bill passed in Mexico’s 
lower house with few objections and was passed unanimously by the 
Senate.28 
Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change (GLCC) commits to a 
long-term target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by fifty 
percent below 2000 levels by 2050.29 The law was amended in 2018 
to incorporate its Paris Agreement targets, which includes an 
 
24. See id. §§ 14, 16, 18–20, 37, 56, 65. 
25. Id. § 37. 
26. Ley General de Cambio Climático [LGCC], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF] 06-06-2012, últimas reformas DOF 13-07-2018 (Mex.). 
27. See Cancún Climate Change Conference – November 2010, UNITED NATIONS 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/past-
conferences/cancun-climate-change-conference-november-2010/cancun-climate-
change-conference-november-2010-0 [https://perma.cc/U7S6-9GMT]; Intro to 
Cancun Agreements, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,  https://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/conferences/past-conferences/cancun-climate-change-conference-
november-2010/cancun-climate-change-conference-november-2010-0 
[https://perma.cc/YS8K-FM68]. The 2009 Copenhagen conference did not adopt a 
binding climate agreement. 15th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/cop-15-copenhagen/ 
[https://perma.cc/4RPA-EG4D].   
28. Erik Vance, Mexico Passes Climate-Change Law, NATURE (Apr. 20, 2012), 
https://www.nature.com/news/mexico-passes-climate-change-law-1.10496 
[https://perma.cc/7MNT-QNNV].  
29.	 Ley General de Cambio Climático [LGCC] art. 2, Diario Oficial de le 
Federación [DOF] 10-10-2012, últimas reformas DOF 13-07-2018 (Mex.); General 






unconditional commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
twenty-two percent by 2030.30 The GLCC also emphasizes 
adaptation measures, calling for “risk atlases” that include 
information about current and future vulnerability scenarios.31 
The GLCC reassigned mandates to several entities. The 
National Institute of Ecology became the National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change (INECC), entrusted with national 
inventory accounting and supporting the evaluation of national 
climate policy.32 The Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate 
Change formally coordinates government action as well as the 
development and implementation of national climate policies.33 The 
GLCC also established the National Climate Change System to 
coordinate the efforts of the federal government, states, and local 
governments.34  
Further, the GLCC creates a climate change fund to channel all 
funding projects that contribute to adaptation and mitigation 
actions,35 and, as part of the 2018 amendment, it launched a national 
emissions trading market.36 Additionally, the Secretariat and the 
Commission will periodically review and, on the basis of the review, 
revise the National Strategy at least every ten years for mitigation 
and at least every six years for adaptation.37 The Commission shall 
propose and approve changes when there are new international 
climate commitments adopted or when new, relevant scientific 
information or technology suggest updates.38 
 
30. Ley General de Cambio Climático [LGCC] transitory art. 2, Diario Oficial de 
le Federación [DOF] 10-10-2012, últimas reformas DOF 13-07-2018 (Mex.). Mexico’s 
GLCC also includes an unconditional commitment to reduce black carbon emissions 
by 51 percent below business as usual by 2030 as well as a conditional target to 
further reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 36 percent and black carbon by 70 
percent below business as usual by 2030, subject to international support. Id. 
31. Id. art. 30. 
32. Id. art. 13, art. 15. 
33. Id. art. 47. 
34. Id. art. 38. 
35. Id. art. 80. 
36. Id. art. 89, 94–95. 
37. Id. art. 61. 




C. New Zealand 
The Climate Change Response Act 2002 created the 
institutional and legal framework for New Zealand to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol and to otherwise meet its obligations under the 
UNFCCC.39 The Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) 
Amendment Act 2008 amended the 2002 Act to introduce the New 
Zealand emissions trading scheme (ETS).40  
The recent 2019 Zero Carbon Amendment makes the Act far 
more comprehensive.41 Originally proposed as a separate piece of 
legislation, the government chose to ensure that all key climate 
legislation was administered by one Act.42 The amendment was 
passed with 119 votes to one, with Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
striking a contrast with the previous administration by declaring 
that New Zealand would not be a “slow follower” on climate change.43 
The Act as amended sets a long-term target of reducing net 
carbon emissions to zero by 2050.44 The amendment also establishes 
five-year carbon budgets.45 It further mandates a periodic climate 
risk assessment with an obligation for the government to create a 
national adaptation plan after each assessment.46   
Further, the amended Act creates a Climate Change 
Commission, an independent advisory body that provides expert 
 
39. See Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 3 (N.Z.). 
40. Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008, ss 3, 
5 (N.Z.). 
41. See Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act 2019 (N.Z.).  
42. Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, N.Z. MINISTRY FOR 
THE ENV’T (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/zero-carbon-
amendment-act#:~:text=The [https://perma.cc/8WG6-C7RJ].  
43. (7 November 2019) 742 NZPD 14899; Laurel Wamsley, New Zealand 
Commits to Being Carbon Neutral by 2050 – With a Big Loophole, NPR (Nov. 7, 2019) 
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/777259573/new-zealand-commits-to-being-carbon-
neutral-by-2050-with-a-big-loophole [https://perma.cc/URT8-GTFM]. Former Prime 
Minister John Key often described New Zealand as a “fast follower, not a leader.” (16 
November 2016) 718 NZPD 15100. 
44. Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, s 5Q. 
45. Id. s 5X. The Ministry of Environment is developing a provisional emissions 
budget for 2021–2025, which will provide an early sense of direction before the next 
series of emissions budgets to be recommended by the Climate Change Commission. 
Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, supra note 42.  
46. Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, ss 5ZP–5ZR. The 
Ministry of Environment has already begun on the first National Climate Change 
Risk Assessment; future Risk Assessments will be carried out by the Climate Change 




advice to the government on mitigation and adaptation and monitors 
its progress towards its goals.47 Other measures ensure 
accountability, such as regular and public reporting. The Minister is 
required to present a copy of the Commission’s report to the House 
of Representatives; the Commission itself must make the document 
publicly available thereafter.48 The Minister must consult with a 
subset of the House of Representatives before finalizing an emissions 
budget, at which point it is registered, presented to the House of 
Representatives, and made publicly available.49 
D. Denmark 
Denmark has historically set ambitious energy targets. But, in 
December 2019, eight of the ten parties in the Danish Parliament 
agreed to completely overhaul its climate policy in a “green 
transition” in order to create a stable direction of travel and a 
comprehensive framework around its climate policies.50 The Climate 
Act explicitly states that Denmark has been a pioneering country in 
international climate action and has a historical and moral 
responsibility to lead on ambition and to inspire and influence 
others.51 
The Act commits Denmark to a long-term target of reaching “net 
zero” emissions by 2050.52 It sets an interim target to reduce 
emissions by seventy percent below 1990 levels by 2030, 53 which 
exceeds both the shared EU target to reduce emissions by forty 
percent below 1990 levels by 203054 and the EU’s amended 2030 
target to reduce emissions by fifty-five percent by 2030.55 The Act 
also mandates that the Minister for Climate, Energy and Utilities 
 
47. Id. pt 1A. 
48. Id. s 5L.  
49. Id. s 5ZD. 
50. See State of Green, During COP25, Denmark Passes Climate Act with a 70 




51. Lov nr. 965, art. 1, af 26.6.2020 om klimal (Den.).  
52. Id.  
53. Id. 
54. Council Conclusions 169/14 of 24 Oct. 2014, 1.  




set national five-year targets that align with the 2050 target; each 
target is set ten years in advance.56 
The Danish Council on Climate Change, which was established 
in 2014,57 has had its funds doubled and mandate expanded.58 The 
climate council is now independent, with a self-electing new 
chairman.59 It also meets with a Climate Dialogue Forum, composed 
of members from think tanks, NGOs, workers organizations, and 
ministries.60 The Council assesses the government’s climate efforts 
and makes recommendations for future climate action.61 
 At least once every five years, the Danish government must 
develop Climate Action Plans that will outline concrete policies to 
reduce emissions in all sectors.62 To monitor progress and ensure 
accountability, the Minister for Climate, Energy and Utilities must 
submit an annual policy report to the parliament on the status of 
greenhouse gas emissions and compliance with international 
obligations.63  
 In what may be a global first, the Act makes a commitment to 
deliver on climate support to developing countries.64 It also requires 
the government to report on emissions from its imports and 
 
56. Lov nr. 965 art. 1. 
57. About the Danish Council on Climate Change, KLIMARÅDET, 
https://klimaraadet.dk/en/about-danish-council-climate-change 
[https://perma.cc/8Q5P-3CK5] (the Danish Council on Climate Change was 
established as a result of the original Climate Change Act No. 716 of 06.25.2014); 
SALLY WEAVER ET AL., OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORY COUNCILS 
8 (Mar. 2019), https://www.ilmastopaneeli.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Overview-
of-national-CCCs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FAP-RF9]. 
58. The Climate Act, GRANTHAM RSCH. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV’T, 
https://climate-laws.org/geographies/297uropa297/laws/the-climate-act 
[https://perma.cc/W4YV-EKX6].  
59. Lov nr. 965 art. 10. 
60. Id. art. 2; DANISH MINISTRY OF CLIMATE, ENERGY & UTILS., DENMARK’S 
INTEGRATED NATIONAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLAN 27–28 (Dec. 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/dk_final_necp_main_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9USF-UP9H].  
61. Lov nr. 965 art. 4. 
62. See id. art. 2. 
63. Id. art. 8 
64. Jocelyn Timperley, Denmark Adopts Climate Law to Cut Emissions 70% by 
2030, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/12/06/denmark-adopts-climate-law-cut-
emissions-70-2030/#:~:text=Denmark's [https://perma.cc/TNN5-TAAL]; see Lov nr. 




consumption.65 The Act also requires the government to prepare an 
annual global strategy to ensure that its foreign, development, and 
trade policies support Denmark’s role as a global leader in 
international climate policy.66 
 Some trends are evident across these examples of climate 
framework laws. The passage of each of these laws reflected political 
momentum for ambitious climate policy at the time of their adoption. 
Each of these countries are among those with the strongest 
engagement in the UNFCCC process. Three have been or will be a 
UNFCCC COP host67 and New Zealand, via the co-leadership of 
Ambassador Jo Tyndall, guided the negotiation process to the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015.68 International pride and 
peer pressure should not be discounted. Danish Minister for Climate, 
Energy and Utilities, Dan Jørgensen, said that in passing their 
climate framework law, “we hope Denmark can inspire other 
countries to follow suit,”69 although the law’s enactment followed 
that of their neighbor, Sweden. Adopted in 2017, Sweden’s Climate 
Act and Policy Framework consists of a climate act, climate targets, 
including reaching zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, and 
a climate policy council.70  
Peer pressure also encourages ambitious target-setting. China’s 
September 2020 announcement that it would reach carbon 
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66. Lov nr. 965 art. 7; Timperley, supra note 64.  
67. Uniting the World to Tackle Climate Change, UN CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONFERENCE UK 2021, https://www.ukcop26.org [https://perma.cc/2PQ7-QVHS]; 
Cancún Climate Change Conference – November 2010, supra note 27; Copenhagen 




68. See Jo Tyndall, From Cancun to Katowice: The Flame of Multilateralism Still 




69. State of Green, supra note 50. 
70. Sweden’s Climate Act and Climate Policy Framework, SWED. ENV’T PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.swedishepa.se/Environmental-objectives-and-
cooperation/Swedish-environmental-work/Work-areas/Climate/Climate-Act-and-
Climate-policy-framework- [https://perma.cc/T9XP-HA49] (Oct. 26, 2020); SWED. 
MINISTRY OF ENV’T & ENERGY, THE SWEDISH CLIMATE POLICY FRAMEWORK 2, 
https://www.government.se/495f60/contentassets/883ae8e123bc4e42aa8d59296ebe




neutrality by 206071 prompted swift target announcements from 
Japan and South Korea. In October 2020, Japan committed to 
reaching net zero emissions by 2050,72 and South Korea announced 
that it would strive to achieve climate neutrality by 2050,73 quickly 
and significantly raising the ambition of climate action in Asia.   
Of these illustrative examples, several do not possess every 
climate framework element, while others created a climate 
framework law by amendment. Mexico’s climate framework law, for 
example, takes a “gradual approach” rather than maximizing 
ambition across the board, and its climate committee is not 
independent.74 New Zealand’s Zero Carbon amendment added to its 
primary climate act, only meeting most of the climate framework law 
criteria with revision.75 Denmark used its Climate Act to overhaul 
its original climate framework.76  
A number of countries have climate frameworks or climate 
targets embedded in law, but lack one or several of the climate 
framework law criteria: a legally-binding, overarching framework; a 
mid-century mitigation target; short-term targets; executive 
authority; an independent climate change committee; and a regular 
review process.77 The European Union has proposed adding its first 
European Climate Law to the 2030 Framework for Energy and 
Climate.78 In doing so, the European Green Deal aspiration to 
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become climate neutral by 2050 will become legally binding.79 
However, the 2030 Framework lacks an independent climate 
committee80 and does not set short-term carbon budgets or five year 
targets, although the subsequent adjustments to the European ETS 
may effectively create a similar ratcheting effect.81 
Kenya, another country that has hosted a COP (COP 12 in 
Nairobi), adopted its Climate Change Act in 2016.82 The Act 
establishes a National Climate Change Council, appointed by the 
President,83 to oversee government implementation of the National 
Climate Change Action Plan, which is to be reviewed and updated 
every five years.84 It also establishes a Climate Change Director to 
act as the lead agency for climate change85 and a Climate Change 
Fund under its national treasury.86 However, the full impact of the 
law has yet to be felt, with the Council yet to be established or meet, 
due in part to lack of political will to comply with the provision.87 The 
Climate Change Fund only received its initial capital in the 
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2018/2019 fiscal year due to draft regulations leaving appropriations 
solely to the discretion of Parliament.88 
Japan’s 1998 Act on Promotion of Global Warming 
Countermeasures is one of two climate laws.89 It refers to its 
emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol90 and 
establishes a Headquarters for the Prevention of Global Warming 
Countermeasures, chaired by the Prime Minister.91 The Act was 
revised upon Japan’s adoption of the Paris Agreement and the 2016 
Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures,92 which will be further 
revised to include its commitment to reach zero emissions by 2050.93 
It is a framework that is updated by targets, rather than targets 
updated by the framework, but has so far proven effective due to 
strong leadership and political will.  
Similarly, South Korea will update its Framework Act on Law 
Carbon Green Growth again. The Framework Act creates a 
legislative framework for mid- and long-term emission reduction 
targets and requires the government to administer national climate 
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strategies with five-year plans over a twenty-year period.94 
Subsequently, the 2016 enforcement decree updated the Green 
Growth law to reflect 2030 targets,95 and the law will be updated 
further to reflect its recently announced 2050 climate neutrality 
target.96 
Do these other countries meet enough of the criteria to qualify 
as the most robust and ambitious types of climate framework laws? 
Governments establish climate laws to give political heft to climate 
actions, raise the visibility of climate change, and to focus, guide, and 
review government action in the short-, medium-, and/or long-term. 
What seems more important, however, than ticking off a box 
matching each of the criteria for a robust climate framework law is 
that some combination of those elements effectively work together in 
tandem with, or in spite of, political will. The empowerment of an 
expert body as well as making the executive government publicly 
accountable has a significant value beyond merely embedding a 
target in law. It helps ensure government effectiveness,97 
accountability, and the durability of climate action over time. 
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V. LEARNING FROM CLIMATE FRAMEWORK 
LAWS 
What lessons can be learned from these exemplary climate 
framework laws? As might be expected, those adopted most recently 
may have few lessons on effectiveness to share, such as New Zealand 
and Denmark’s newer frameworks.98  Nevertheless, legal scholars 
have examined some of these climate framework laws’ shortcomings 
and their overall benefits may outweigh the risks of addressing 
climate change at such a high level. 
A. Lessons Learned 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment, in examining the effectiveness of the UK’s framework 
law over its first decade, found that its Climate Change Act improved 
the political debate on climate change, in part by establishing an 
agreed empirical evidence base.99 The Act helped preserve the 
political consensus on climate action and long-term ambition despite 
political and economic turbulence.100 It has helped grow the UK’s 
international standing on climate change.101 Finally, it was a major 
driver in radically transforming the country’s power sector.102 
The Institute similarly found that Mexico’s GLCC laid 
important institutional foundations that have helped mainstream 
the climate change agenda across the government.103 The GLCC has 
strengthened political continuity, highlighting updates to the Law to 
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maintain consistency with international commitments.104 By raising 
political awareness and recognition of climate change and the 
benefits of a low-carbon transition, the quality of the political debate 
has improved.105 Finally, the Law has advanced Mexico’s low-carbon 
energy transition by facilitating energy reforms and aided the 
negotiation of an energy transition law.106  
In New Zealand, the 2017 Ardern government inaugurated a 
phase of rapid policy development, with the climate law drawing 
especially on UK and EU examples. The recent October 2020 election 
looks likely to maintain the political momentum that established the 
law, with James Shaw continuing as New Zealand’s climate change 
minister, maintaining his place in the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and 
gaining the role of associate environment minister.107 Senior 
researcher David Hall credits the law with the suspension of offshore 
oil and gas permits as a potentially major but disputed achievement 
as well as the decision to split targets for CO2 and methane, which 
means that agricultural methane is treated separately.108 He says 
that “[i]f the science behind the decision eventually informs the 
international accounting of greenhouse gases, it will have major 
ramifications for developing countries whose economies also rely 
heavily on agriculture.”109 
B. Challenges and Shortcomings 
In its assessment of the UK’s Climate Change Act, the 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
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Environment noted that while there were no outright failures, some 
of the expectations of lawmakers have not been fully met.110 They 
note that the Act on its own is not sufficiently investible; the carbon 
policies stemming from the Act provide less long-term clarity than 
investors desire.111 There is concern that without stronger 
enforcement, there may be insufficient protection against 
backsliding once pressure has to be placed on sectors that will be 
more difficult to decarbonize.112 Government buy-in is uneven across 
departments, and there has been more adaptation planning than 
adaptation action.113 
The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment has also noted some challenges for Mexico’s GLCC, 
which relate to its design, institutional and financial capacity, and 
political will.114 The law defines general responsibilities without 
setting sufficiently clear mandates or implementation guidelines, 
making coordination and implementation challenging without 
specific goals and stronger coordination among ministries.115 Its 
accountability mechanisms are weak—the law has no independent 
body to enforce accountability, nor does it establish sanctions for non-
compliance.116 The law has further been ineffective in allocating 
public sources to implement climate policy and the Climate Change 
Fund has received little funding.117 Finally, they identify gaps in 
political commitment and leadership, as significant disagreements 
on how to take climate action continue and opposition from fossil-fuel 
intensive companies slow implementation.118 
Despite its recent passage, there is some early criticism of New 
Zealand’s Zero Carbon law. One is that, despite the law, the 
government’s climate actions still are not going far enough and will 
not produce immediate emission reductions towards its 2030 target 
under the Paris Agreement.119  
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Countries considering developing and implementing climate 
framework laws do so not without risks. As evidenced in some of the 
cases mentioned, it takes enormous effort and preparation to lay the 
groundwork for an effective and comprehensive climate framework 
law. A shift in political will may mean that law never gets off the 
ground. In other cases, it may be more effective to add to or combine 
existing laws to create the necessary framework. 
If mid- or long-term targets are embedded into the climate law 
without a way to review or revise them other than by passing a new 
law, the targets risks being outdated quickly in the fast-moving 
global discussions and negotiations to limit global warming. This 
situation further risks locking in ambition over the long-term, 
particularly if political will shifts or leadership changes. 
Additionally, while making emission reduction and other climate 
targets legally binding raises their profile and gives them greater 
political gravitas, it also can create legal causes of action for not 
achieving them. Embedding targets in law opens governments to the 
risk of litigation for not acting or doing enough to meet them, as will 
be discussed Part VII. 
D. Benefits 
In most cases, the expectations of the gains incurred by climate 
framework laws are met in practice. Climate framework laws 
provide for a raft of benefits that include nationwide policy 
coherence, focused, more effective government action, and greater 
accountability. First, the creation of an organizational structure and 
formal mandates for climate-specific responsibilities can create the 
kind of institutional capacity that enables both executive 
government and the ministries, agencies, and departments that 
support them to better align existing policies with the overarching 
targets or replacement altogether with those fit for purpose. The 
effective engagement of government agencies at all levels can 
achieve, even if over time, the kind of buy-in necessary for a whole-
of-government approach to climate action, particularly given the 




internally consistent act, a climate framework law can increase 
efficiency and lower administrative costs.120  
Climate framework laws can enable better greenhouse gas data 
management. That one cannot manage what one does not measure 
is at the heart of emission reduction efforts, but elides the 
intensiveness of the measurement, reporting verification (MRV) 
processes that underpin them.121 For countries, developed countries 
in particular, the capacity to generate this data at the national level 
has grown over decades given the obligations under UNFCCC 
reporting processes.122 For developing countries who historically 
have had less capacity, generating this data and complying with the 
technical requirements of international reporting and review has 
been challenging, particularly when they must wait on international 
funding to hire often one-off, outside consultants to aid with 
reporting. Climate framework laws, in setting out mandates for data 
collection and for entities and departments to share relevant 
information with one another, and by increasing domestic expertise 
and capacity, greatly facilitate the ability to produce better quality 
greenhouse gas emissions inventory reports and understand the 
carbon intensity of specific sectors. 
These types of laws create the mid- to long-term stability and 
vision that policymakers and markets need to take climate action 
and transition to a low carbon economy. This is one of the key goals 
and markers of such a law: durability. However, a climate plan alone, 
a legally binding 2050 target alone, or the executive authority to 
manage such a pathway alone may not provide for stability, as noted 
earlier. In many jurisdictions, executive rulemakings will not bind 
future governments, leaving them vulnerable to amendment or 
repeal by the next administration.123 Moreover, an executive order 
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alone may indicate that climate policy has not acquired widespread 
political support for legislative enactment. 124  
But, combining all or some of these elements, a binding long-
term target, particularly in combination with shorter mid-term 
targets or rolling carbon budgets, executive branch authority to take 
action on climate, and/or some process by which targets can be 
updated or reassessed, can generate greater capacity to define a legal 
structure that survives elections and holds future governments 
accountable. In turn, this lends the law political weight and 
visibility, both domestically and internationally. It legitimizes 
climate action both among constituents, but also among 
international peers; it provides an important signal about the 
earnestness of climate action.125  
Finally, it turns out that climate laws produce real greenhouse 
gas emission reductions. A 2020, study by Shaikh Eskander and Sam 
Fankhauser, two scholars associated with the Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, examined 
climate laws passed from 1999 to 2016. It indicates that, in countries 
with a strong rule of law, each new climate law can reduce annual 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of gross domestic product by 
0.78 percent nationally in the first three years and by 1.79 percent 
in year four and beyond.126 In 2016, current climate laws were 
associated with an annual reduction in global CO2 emissions of 5.9 
GtCO2.127 From 1999 to 2016, cumulative CO2 emissions savings 
amount to 38 GtCO2—about one year’s worth of global CO2 
output.128  
While the study does not differentiate climate framework laws 
as defined in this article and would not take into account laws passed 
after 2016, perhaps future studies might be able to demonstrate 
whether and by how much climate framework laws are likely to 
produce even greater emission reductions, given their stability and 
ambition over time. The study did demonstrate, however, that 
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legislative acts were more effective drivers of emission reductions 
than executive orders.129 
Additionally, for countries with climate framework laws or 
strong climate framework policies, such laws and policies provided 
unexpected benefits in 2020. They have enabled some countries to 
quickly respond to the novel coronavirus pandemic and resulting 
economic fallout by providing a blueprint for a recovery and stimulus 
plan that is both sustainable and consistent with long-term climate 
ambition. For instance, the EU’s Green Deal provided ready-made 
plans tailored for a “green” recovery. On May 27, 2020 the European 
Commission agreed to NextGenerationEU, an economic recovery 
package and fund developed in line with the objectives of the Green 
Deal that will be used to accelerate Europe’s green and digital 
transition.130 
VI. CLIMATE FRAMEWORK LAWS AND THE UN 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE  
As Michael Mehling has noted, watershed developments in 
international climate diplomacy have generally been accompanied 
by an increase in legislative activity.131 These developments are the 
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the climate summits 
in Copenhagen and Cancún in 2009 and 2010, and the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement in 2015. However, the Grantham Research 
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Institute on Climate Change and the Environment cautions that it 
is difficult to “discern an impact of external factors, such as 
international climate negotiations, on national climate 
legislation.”132 Their data reveals that global legislative activity 
peaked around 2009-2014 and that the legislative impact of the Paris 
Agreement appears limited.133 Some experts say that climate 
framework laws, like that of Mexico, instead reflect a “trend in which 
individual states and countries, frustrated with stalled United 
Nations climate agreements, have begun implementing their own 
emissions regulations.”134 
How might the Paris Agreement influence countries that may 
legislate their international climate targets or their climate policies 
more broadly? Its unique hybridization of top-down (internationally 
binding) obligations and bottom-up (nationally determined) targets 
create a system meant to ratchet up ambition and action over the 
long term.135 In the next few years, the global climate community 
will finally shift the more than two-decade-old climate negotiation 
process into one that focuses primarily on the implementation of 
climate commitments.136  
The Paris Agreement has a number of features that may 
influence how countries adapt, improve, or create new domestic 
processes in order to comply with its obligations. All parties to the 
Agreement are required to maintain a nationally determined 
contribution (NDC) that outlines their self-defined mitigation 
goals.137 They are legally obligated to pursue domestic measures 
with the aim of achieving those goals.138 Every five years, they must 
update or communicate a new NDC.139 
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The Agreement reaffirms the UNFCCC goal of keeping average 
warming below two degrees Celsius while pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.140 It 
articulates two long-term emission goals: first, a peaking of 
emissions as soon as possible (recognizing it will take longer for 
developing countries); second, a goal of net greenhouse gas neutrality 
in the second half of this century. 141 In line with these aims, the 
Paris Agreement encourages parties to develop and communicate 
“long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.”142  
The Paris Agreement also establishes an enhanced 
transparency framework that covers reporting and review of 
information on parties’ emissions, mitigation efforts, and support 
provided or received.143 It requires developed countries (and 
encourages other countries providing support) to report in their 
biennial transparency reports on the support for developing 
countries they have provided or mobilized.144 Developing countries 
should provide information on financial, technology transfer and 
capacity-building support needed and received.145 
To promote rising ambition, the Agreement created a new 
mechanism—a “global stocktake”—to assess collective progress 
toward meeting the agreement’s long-term goals.146 Parties will then 
submit new NDCs, “informed by the outcomes of the global 
stocktake.”147 Article six of the Paris Agreement recognizes that 
parties may cooperate voluntarily in the implementation of their 
NDCs, in order to allow for "higher ambition . . . and to promote 
sustainable development and environmental integrity.”148 Legal 
scholars Michal Nachmany and Emily Mangan believe that 
legislative implementation of the Paris Agreement is far from 
 
140. Id. art. 2. 
141. Id. art. 4. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. art. 13. 
144. Id.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. art. 14. 
147. Id art. 4. 
148. Id. art. 6. The rules guiding this mechanism have yet to be adopted but 




complete, given that few NDC emission pledges are matched by 
legislated national emissions targets.149  
However, perhaps the most significant impact of the Paris 
Agreement has been on the ambition of new laws.150 The passage of 
legally binding, mid-century climate neutrality goals indicates that 
governments are responding to the long-term nature of the climate 
crisis, with some of the climate framework laws explicitly mentioning 
the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals. For example, New Zealand’s 
Zero Carbon amendment creates a framework by which the country 
can develop and implement clear and stable climate change policies 
that “contribute to the global effort under the Paris Agreement to 
limit the global average temperature increase to 1.5° Celsius above 
preindustrial levels.” 151 Denmark’s Climate Act declares that its 
government must work to achieve “the Paris Agreement’s target of 
limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees.” 152 Its interim 
targets must take into account the Paris Agreement and be no less 
ambitious than the most recently set target, mirroring the Paris 
Agreement principle of “no backsliding” and progression.153 
While a major motivation for adopting a climate framework laws 
is the political weight and visibility it affords to climate change154 or 
the prestige of demonstrating international climate leadership, 
combining the functional elements of a climate framework law in 
such a way that they generally echo that of the Paris process provides 
for significant domestic and international benefits. Although not a 
legal obligation by the Paris Agreement, the increasing legal or 
aspirational adoption of long-term low greenhouse gas emission 
development strategies (which in many cases have been “net zero” or 
climate neutrality goals to be achieved by 2050) has led to countries 
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working backwards to understand where their interim NDCs ought 
to align with a net zero pathway. Looking at the broader context of 
their climate action and thinking about sectoral long-term strategies 
has helped countries understand how they can make their NDCs 
clearer and more ambitious than they might otherwise have.155 
Another notable trend has been the number of countries that have 
submitted official long-term decarbonization strategies and, within a 
year or two, have embedded a more ambitious climate neutrality 
target in law.156  
Governments will also need to take into account information 
from the global stocktake in their target-setting process. The review 
processes and climate change committees tasked with assessing new 
science and updating or realigning the ambition of interim targets in 
climate framework laws make this work pro forma and ostensibly 
provide for greater accountability over time. 
As noted earlier, climate framework laws can support more 
robust and effective greenhouse gas and sectoral data 
management.157 Under the Paris Agreement’s enhanced 
transparency framework, developing countries will be required to 
report on their climate action every two years, which is a change in 
frequency with significant capacity implications.158 In addition, the 
new financial reporting requirements may require further or 
additional coordination between ministries. For countries with 
climate framework laws, particularly those that may manage 
climate funds tracking financial flows, finding, tracking, and 
reporting this data becomes easier, and making it public provides for 
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greater accountability to constituents and the international 
community.  
Acknowledging the urgent need for short-term climate action, 
Nachmany and Mangan focus on whether a party’s NDC target has 
been matched by legislated national emission targets.159 However, 
in some instances, this may over credit the effectiveness of short-
term climate legislation, which may not last beyond its five or ten 
years, be out of sync with a mid-century net zero pathway, lock in 
ambition without a process for its updating, or meaningfully relate 
to its subsequent NDC if it also not linked to a climate neutrality 
goal. Climate framework laws are notable for their ability to provide 
practical functions that echo Paris processes designed to ensure the 
appropriate amount of short-term ambition in the context of 2050 
climate neutrality, with regular accountability so that climate action 
is durable over the long-term. 
VII. CLIMATE LITIGATION AND CLIMATE 
FRAMEWORK LAWS  
The increase in litigation against governments for failing to act 
sufficiently on climate change raises the question of whether climate 
laws or even legally binding NDC targets are sufficient to 
demonstrate adequate climate action. In the Urgenda case, the 
Netherland’s emissions reduction target, despite its legality and the 
government’s ongoing efforts to achieve it, was deemed 
insufficient.160 The Urgenda Foundation, a Dutch environmental 
group, and 900 Dutch citizens sued the Dutch government, claiming 
that the government’s existing commitment to reduce emissions by 
seventeen percent below 1990 levels by 2020 did not meet its fair 
contribution toward the UNFCCC goal of keeping global 
temperature increase below two degrees Celsius.161 The case 
ultimately went to the Dutch Supreme Court, which upheld the 
ruling requiring the government to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
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to twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by 2020.162 Similar cases 
have been launched in other countries.163  
At the other end of the spectrum, Brazil is facing several 
lawsuits for not implementing its National Policy on Climate 
Change, a climate change framework that develops Brazil’s climate 
action plans, manages Brazil’s Climate Fund, and is tasked with 
meeting its obligations under the UNFCCC.164 A climate skeptic who 
has portrayed environmental concerns as a threat to national 
sovereignty, President Jair Bolsanaro, elected in 2018, brought 
about an abrupt shift in Brazil’s environmental agenda, having since 
demoted his climate policy ministry165 and militarized 
environmental forces around the Amazon rainforest.166  
As a result, four political parties have brought a case against the 
government, which reached a Supreme Court hearing in September 
2020. They allege that the government’s inaction regarding the 
Climate Fund is a violation of constitutional and international 
obligations.167 Additionally, on November 11, 2020, an NGO 
coalition brought an action against the Brazilian government to the 
Federal Supreme Court for failing to execute the primary national 
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deforestation policy.168 These cases demonstrate the dangers that a 
change in political leadership can have on even established climate 
laws without additional safeguards. 
So how do countries with climate framework laws, which embed 
ambitious emission reduction targets and transformative policies 
into law, fare in terms of climate litigation? The UK’s Climate 
Change Act has been challenged in a number of recent cases. To 
start, in 2018, Plan B, an environmental charity and eleven citizens 
impacted by climate change filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy.169 They alleged 
that the Secretary of State violated the Climate Change Act by 
failing to revise the 2050 carbon reduction target in light of new 
international law and scientific developments.170 Ultimately, the 
High Court and Court of Appeal denied all grounds for judicial 
review and a subsequent appeal, finding that officials exercised 
proper discretion and understanding of the Paris Agreement and 
climate-related advice.171 
Next, in 2019, Claire Stephenson challenged a section of the 
UK's National Planning Policy Framework that promoted fracking, 
claiming, in part, that it ran afoul of the UK's commitment to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Climate Change Act of 2008, 
claims that the court rejected.172 Then, in March 2020, a UK court of 
appeal said that plans to expand Heathrow Airport were unlawful 
because they failed to take into account the Paris Agreement.173 The 
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case is particularly significant because the Paris Agreement does not 
form part of UK law or was incorporated into the Climate Change 
Act, meaning that the Paris Agreement should have been considered 
on its own account.  
Finally, on May 18, 2020, three plaintiffs sought judicial review 
of the British government’s 2011 energy national policy statements 
on the ground that they must be reevaluated in light of the 
amendment to the Climate Change Act’s mid-century climate 
neutrality target, the Paris Agreement, the IPCC special report on 
1.5 degrees of warming, the UK Parliament’s climate emergency 
declaration, and the UK’s departure from the European Union.174 An 
amended summons was filed in June 2020.175  
Mexico is also facing a legal challenge. In September 2020, 
fifteen young people filed a federal suit against the Mexican 
government, requesting that the Mexican government issue 
regulations and public policies under the General Law on Climate 
Change and Mexican Constitution.176 They claim that there are no 
regulations or public policies to implement the law.177 
Whether or not a climate target is embedded in law, citizens are 
interested in the effectiveness of their government’s climate action 
and the fulfillment of its obligations under the Paris Agreement. 
When that target provides a legal cause of action, citizens can more 
easily take their claims to court. These early cases suggest that it 
may not be easy to prevail, but the government is nevertheless forced 
to illustrate that it is undertaking specific efforts to achieve its 
targets in accordance with the law. The government may be able to 
bring greater evidence to bear on its behalf when the broader legal 
framework that constitutes most climate framework laws address 
not just a short-term emission reduction target, but a wider economic 
and societal transformation to a low-carbon society that the Paris 
Agreement demands. 
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VIII. THE FUTURE FOR CLIMATE FRAMEWORK 
LAWS  
With more and more countries setting net zero targets, the trend 
in adopting climate framework laws seems likely to continue.178 The 
Netherlands and Germany have recently passed climate laws, 
though neither of them features independent climate committees or 
rolling carbon budgets. The Netherlands passed its Climate Act in 
July 2019.179 The Act sets legally binding greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets of forty-nine percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and 
95 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, along with provisions for 
developing an implementation plan, measuring progress, and 
monitoring compliance and accountability.180 Germany passed its 
“Klimaschutzgesetz,” or climate protection “package,” in December 
2019. The package consists of a policy program of measures, 
including a “Climate Action Programme 2030” and a Climate 
Protection Act.181 The Act provides for a fifty-five percent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2030 and 
greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050.182 
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Fiji and Chile have proposed climate framework laws similar to 
those of the UK and New Zealand.183 In August 2019, Fiji presented 
a bill for a Climate Change Act to parliament and planned to present 
a final draft in May 2020.184 The Act sets out a plan for Fiji to achieve 
net zero carbon emissions by 2050, establishes a National Climate 
Change Coordination Committee, manages its MRV processes, 
introduces a carbon crediting scheme, and designates thirty percent 
of Fiji’s waters a marine protected area by 2030.185 In January 2020, 
the Chilean government submitted a bill to Congress for a climate 
framework law that will transform Chile’s implementation of climate 
change action.186 The law enables the Environment Ministry to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions for the first time.187 It features a 
Long-Term Climate Strategy that sets national targets, including 
carbon neutrality by 2050, and mitigation adaptation goals for each 
sector that must be met within ten years.188 It reforms the 
Ministerial Council for Sustainability to give it new powers, and it 
will produce a National Climate Change Action Report and Regional 
Climate Change Action Plans.189 The law will also create incentives 
for environmental donations that can be earmarked for the 
Environmental Protection Fund for environmental projects.190 
 
183. Fiji and Chile are two countries that have also hosted COPs: COP 23 and 
COP 25, respectively. Live from COP23: Behind the Scenes in Bonn, SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. GOALS, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/11/cop23-
liveblog/ [https://perma.cc/QDL3-EZ2D]; UN Climate Change – December 2019, U.N 
CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://unfccc.int/cop25 [https://perma.cc/MBX8-
LQQ4].  
184. Fiji Proposes New Climate Change Laws, RNZ (Aug. 7, 2019, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/396178/fiji-proposes-new-climate-
change-laws [https://perma.cc/53M9-L7WN]; Lena Reece, Climate Change Bill to Be 
Tabled in Parliament in May, FBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2020, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/parliament/climate-change-bill-to-be-tabled-in-
parliament-in-may [https://perma.cc/MZL8-P5U6]. 
185. Climate Change Bill 2019, cl. 13, 35, 46, 85 (Fiji).  
186. Press Release, Gov’t of Chile, The Gov’t Unveils Climate Change Bill 













The urgency of effective climate action in both the near- and 
long-term and the relative success of climate framework laws have 
provoked calls for a climate law in countries like Canada191 and 
Australia.192 At the time of writing, both countries proposed to 
embed their 2050 climate neutrality targets in law. In November 
2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau presented a bill that would 
commit Canada to cut its emissions to net zero by 2050 and set five-
year targets from 2030 to meet the goal.193 The proposed Canadian 
Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act would require every 
department and federal corporation to include climate risks in their 
planning and sets up an independent body to advise the government 
on how to achieve the net zero goal.194 “If passed, future governments 
would have to report regularly on progress towards meeting the 
goals.”195  However, the bill does not set out how the government will 
reduce emissions in the short-term nor does it propose a new 2030 
target.196  Given that the legislation indicates that it could take up 
to a year and a half for Canada to adopt a new 2030 target, it is 
unlikely that Canada will enhance its 2030 NDC in 2020, when 
countries were expected to submit their new or enhanced NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement.197 
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Also, in November 2020, two bills were submitted to Australia’s 
Parliament that would mandate a net zero 2050 goal.198 The 
legislation would also “establish an independent Climate Change 
Commission to advise the prime minister and Parliament on 
emissions budgets and reduction strategies.”199 Further, “the 
commission would be required to prepare national climate change 
risk assessments and low emission technology statements.” 200 
Because the proposed legislation does not come from the governing 
coalition, it must first go through a committee inquiry and public 
comment period before the legislator can request Parliamentary 
hearings and press for a vote. The biggest obstacle is that Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison remains reluctant to adopt ambitious 
emissions reduction targets, despite growing international 
pressure.201 
The election of President Joe Biden has heightened hopes for 
ambitious U.S. leadership on climate action. The U.S. came close to 
passing a climate law in 2010, when the Senate failed to pass the 
Waxman-Markey bill that would have adopted American Clean 
Energy and Security Act.202 The Act would have established a cap-
and-trade plan similar to that of the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme.203 Without it, federal efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and improve energy efficiency have mostly been managed 
under the Clean Air Act204 and the Energy Policy Act.205 With 
Congress largely unwilling to take expansive bipartisan climate 
action, proactive administrations have resorted to passing standards 
or executive orders to reduce greenhouse gas emissions only to have 
them tied up in litigation or repealed by the next administration.206  
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On his first day in office, Biden had the U.S. rejoin the Paris 
Agreement and promised to ensure that the U.S. reaches net zero 
emissions by 2050.207 He also appointed former Secretary of State 
John Kerry as the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change, 
who will participate, for the first time, on the National Security 
Council.208  He also appointed his domestic counterpart, the first 
White House National Climate Advisor and former Environmental 
Protection Agency Administrator, Gina McCarthy, in December 
2020.209  
Reentry into the Paris Agreement, however, requires a credible 
NDC—not just a target number, but also climate legislation and 
policies by which to achieve that target. A commitment to climate 
neutrality requires even more ambitious legislation. However, with 
a strong likelihood of a Republican majority Senate, the robust 
climate legislation hoped for seems unlikely. A conservative 
dominated Supreme Court has further raised questions about how 
narrowly it could read the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
obligation to regulate greenhouse gas emissions210 or even whether 
that legal basis under the Clean Air Act could be overturned.211  
 
207. The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, 
BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan [https://perma.cc/HL96-XHJY]. 
208. Ben Geman, Unpacking Joe Biden's Decision to Tap John Kerry as His 
Climate Envoy, AXIOS, https://www.axios.com/biden-john-kerry-climate-envoy-
c8f09519-41b1-439a-8b88-
f4ddd1f5b2e0.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=org
anic&utm_content=1100 [https://perma.cc/6UY8-S4EW] (Nov. 23, 2020). 
209.	 Jennifer Ludden, Biden Announces Climate Team, Including 1st-Ever 
National Climate Adviser, NPR (Dec. 20, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/20/948315477/climate-czar [https://perma.cc/26YD-
RZZH]. 
210. Jean Chemnick, High Court in Trump Mold Could Undercut Key Law for 
Climate, E&E NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063715303 
[https://perma.cc/4R4Q-X8FB]. 
211. Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Landmark Supreme Court Climate Ruling 







Neither the U.S.’s first NDC212 nor its long-term low emission 
development strategy213 were enacted into law, and both were 
abandoned by the Trump administration long before the formal 
withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement. A new NDC, mid-
century target, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and 
climate committee could just as easily be discarded by a new 
administration as it was by the Trump administration. 
A U.S. climate framework law would alleviate, if not avoid, 
many of these questions. A law that consolidated authority for 
climate action would provide for stability in staff and expertise, as 
well as provide clear mandates for various departments. It would 
provide a climate lens for other government functions, like trade 
police and financial investments, that would help reduce policies and 
actions that would conflict with or undermine U.S. climate goals. A 
legally binding mid-century net zero target and at least one interim 
target matching the U.S. NDC objective would make it harder for a 
future administration to escape the obligation to achieve them. An 
independent climate change committee would provide additional 
accountability, regularly monitoring new scientific and technological 
developments with implications for agreed targets and policies and 
maintaining pressure on the executive to implement them. Such a 
law would mean that climate action was no longer a political 
question and provide for a cause of action in a court system where 
plaintiffs have otherwise had difficulty demonstrating standing, 
causation, or an addressable harm. A functional climate framework 
would provide a clear channel for most climate litigation, 
particularly that which would confront the government for 
underperformance of its duties.  
The U.S. does not lack the resources and capacity to make this 
transformational change; for now, it is a matter of political will.214 
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The focus on climate in the Biden-Harris campaign was historic, but 
Americans will have to continue to fight for the support needed for 
climate action. Most Americans do support climate action, but many 
have been misinformed about its costs and consequences.215 
A Biden administration could think about establishing pieces of 
a future climate framework law structure that could be built on or 
pulled together by law in a future administration with a more 
supportive Congress. One possibility is an independent climate 
commission that could later be reformed to fit within the climate 
framework law. One candidate could be the We Are Still In coalition, 
a collective of American institutions that have remained committed 
to ambitious climate action despite the withdrawal of federal 
leadership.216 Its diverse range of stakeholders and expertise, which 
include academic, indigenous, faith, and business leadership, would 
be suited for the advisory role.217 
Other countries with comparable politics and policy structures 
for addressing climate change face similar challenges. One of the 
commonalities through the UK, Mexican, New Zealand, and Danish 
examples was that political leadership capitalized on moments of 
widespread support for ambitious climate action, buoyed perhaps by 
key moments in the climate negotiations. With no further climate 
treaties to be adopted, it is possible, but not guaranteed, that 
increasingly devastating climate change impacts may begin to 
generate the necessary concern and collective will to act on climate. 
More optimistically, it is possible that climate framework laws that 
effectively demonstrate that economic growth and emission 
reductions are not mutually exclusive, that help to more and more 
cheaply achieve those emissions reductions, and that provide jobs 




215. Isabelle Gerretsen, 5 Ways Climate Issues Played Out in the US Election, 
CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Nov. 5, 2020, 5:42 PM), 
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/11/05/5-ways-climate-issues-played-us-
election [https://perma.cc/625N-QKDF]. 
216. See WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com [https://perma.cc/4R8C-
6AFQ]. Now, AMERICA IS ALL IN, https://www.americaisallin.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/X7BG-FVJJ].  





Unfortunately, having a few climate policies or embedding 
climate targets into law do not in themselves hold future leadership 
to climate action. The uptick in climate framework laws is 
encouraging given that it makes it significantly harder for future 
leadership to roll back climate ambition, particularly where citizens 
can access litigation as a tool to enlist the courts to ensure the 
effectiveness of those laws. 
In many ways, it may seem daunting to establish a climate 
framework law. For some countries, an additional law could cohere 
existing pieces of climate legislation, while in others it would be 
necessary to create the structure element by element. For many, the 
cost to achieve a target like climate neutrality by 2050 seems 
economically formidable. However, in November 2020, the chief 
executive of the UK’s Committee on Climate Change found that 
reaching net zero carbon emissions in the UK is likely to be much 
easier and cheaper than previously thought. The chief executive 
noted that, “[o]verall, the cost is surprisingly low—it’s cheaper than 
even we thought last year when we made our assessments,” and that 
“[n]et zero is relatively low-cost across the economy.”218 The quick 
pace of declining costs in renewable energy in the last decade have 
put solar and wind at a lower cost than fossil fuels around the world, 
encouraging a global boom in clean power.219 In many cases, this 
means the future costs of climate action are being overestimated. 
Climate framework laws could be even more robust. Several 
countries have used their climate framework laws to launch or 
govern their emissions trading systems. One unique feature of the 
Danish climate law is that it provides for public participation 
through a citizens’ council that provides feedback when developing 
climate policy.220  While some climate framework laws have 
addressed adaptation, it may also be worthwhile to consider what an 
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equally robust framework might look like for a country with 
relatively little emissions but significant adaptive needs.221 
Depending on how effective the EU’s Just Transition Fund proves to 
be in practice, it may offer itself as one example of a mechanism to 
ensure environmental justice and to aid specific communities or 
regions that will be substantially impacted by the transition to a low 
carbon economy.  
For now, the establishment of these laws, their contribution to 
real greenhouse gas emissions, and their role as drivers for long-term 
transformation are remarkable achievements. They can provide 
long-term stability for climate action, taking the reins out of the 
hands of a particular leader or party and placing them in the shared 
power of the executive branch, the courts, and the public. They 
further promise to provide powerful examples of how to effectively 
drive the necessary economic and social transformation required to 
safeguard human life in the face of climate change and its impacts. 
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